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The limits of agrarian reform in Brazil
 “The  classic  agrarian  reform  program,  which  most  industrialized 
countries  have  done  in  the  northern  hemisphere,  democratizing  the 
property and creating the internal markets depend on a political project 
of national development based on industrialization. This left the agenda 
of Brazil. Not because it is not a way, but because the Brazilian industrial 
bourgeoisie never had a national development project. This kind of land 
reform is unviable by them, unfortunately”. João Pedro Stédile.
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a) The limits of the agrarian reform:
This text was born from an alert: land concentration in Brazil has grown in the last ten 
years. As part of its economy reprimarization confined in a present-future framework 
of exponential growth in demand for fuels (biodiesel), minerals (especially iron) and 
food, the agrarian frontier of agribusiness has full-grown. Between 2003 and 2010, the 
area of large farms increased from 214,843,865ha to 318,904,739ha, from 51.3% to 
55.8% of the total, a 48.4% of increase of this profile of property in the period. The 
other profiles have also grown during this period in terms of area; the smallholdings 
evolved from 38.9 to 46.6 million hectares, small farms from 74.1 to 88.7 millions, and 
medium properties from 88.1 to 113.8 million hectares. However, in percentage terms, 
these three types of properties lost space. 
The swiftness of these changes is explained by a positioning of the Brazilian economy 
towards a greater specialization in the production of primary commodities (the so-
called reprimarization).  Between 2000 and 2009 the Brazilian participation in these 
exports  jumped  from  2.77% to  4.66% and  the  participation  of  the  country  in  the 
exports of goods with high intensity (according to the methodology of UNCTAD, 2002), 
decreases from 0.52% to 0.49%, a clear loss of market share. To some extent, these 
changes arise from a strategy of currency appreciation in order to obtain productivity 
gains  in  exporting,  mining  and  oil  production  sectors,  due  to  the  growing  global 
demand led by China. On the other hand, evidently, and in a deeper way, it is on the 
horizon deindustrialization and a  form of  integration into the world  economy that 
reproduce and extend the existence of large estates in the Brazilian society. We must 
also  consider  that  behind  the  issue  of  the  exchange-rate  appreciation  it  is  the 
dependence on the financial  capital,  which is  pressing for  a  high interest  rate  and 
mechanisms of fictitious wealth recovery via debt, certainly, based on the execution of 
constant and extended primary surpluses. 
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 Professores  do  Departamento  de  Economia  da  Universidade  Federal  do  Espírito 
Santo.
Finally, the Brazilian government and society, in tables of financial globalization, have 
made a very clear  choice,  in which there is no room for reform in land ownership. 
Obviously, the idea of land reform raises several interpretations, which is not the case 
to  discuss  here.  However,  when  using  this  term  we  refer  broadly  to  a  policy  of 
redistribution of  land ownership  in  favor  of  small  and medium properties,  that  is, 
necessarily,  for  a  tighter  fiscal  policy  for  large  estates,  especially  the  unproductive 
ones, for a policy of incentives and subsidies, for an education policy and lending long 
term credit  at  achievable  rates.  This  definitely  has  not  been the path taken.   The 
government did not even want, for instance, to change the reference parameters for 
measuring the degree of utilization (GU) and the Degree of Efficiency of Farms (GEE), 
which are still based on data from the Brazilian agriculture of 1975. That is, as Teixeira 
notes, “In Brazil, the large productive property is so classified when observing the rate 
of agricultural income 35 years ago”, which is obviously much lower than current rates 
of  productivity  due  to  the  massive  use  of  manure,  fertilizers,  herbicides  and  new 
planting techniques. 
Another  issue to  be addressed is  the acquisition of  land in the country by  foreign 
capital. An example of this practice is to acquire land for the production of ethanol, 
soy,  corn,  cultures  related  to  the  rising  demand  for  agro-energy,  food  and  raw 
materials  by  the  banking  and  financial  capital,  traditionally  averse  to  tying  up  of 
resources and related loss of liquidity. According to Sauer & Milk, as in World Bank 
study,  the  global  demand  for  land  has  been  enormous,  especially  from  2008  on, 
making the territorial dispute a global phenomenon, “the transfer of agricultural land 
was approximately four million hectares per year before 2008, only between October 
2008 and August 2009 were sold over 45 million hectares, of which a 75% in Africa and 
another  3.6  million  hectares  in  Brazil  and  Argentina”.  Still  with  the  authors,  it  is 
possible to observe that the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the primary sector 
grew from $2.4 to $13.1 billion between 2002 and 2008, showing an increase of 445%. 
This is a new phase, extended, of the strategy to acquire a factor that will certainly be 
scarce in the near future and, surely, the property speculation is at stake: it occurs in 
Brazil, mainly in the “new” boundaries for the monoculture of soy, sugar cane in the 
states of Tocantins, Goias, Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas Gerais, a 33% gain in land 
prices, greatly inflating the cost of any policy of expropriation of land with a view to 
reform. The apparent paradox of this strategy is the fact that the most evolved forms 
of appreciation of the value interfere in the circuit D-D’, subvert the historical time and 
retake a secular practice of real estate speculation, which has accompanied the history 
of capitalism in the last thirty years, namely, a real estate speculation.  
An example of this strategy is the role of the banker George Soros. According to a 
report from October 2006, the man who has speculated against the Bank of England 
and  against  almost  all  currencies  in  Asia  and  Brazil  in  2002,  is  now  investing  in 
agribusiness. This 76 years old man, with a fortune estimated at $7.2 billion, just joined 
the team of foreign billionaires betting on Brazilian ethanol. As Bill Gates, owner of 
Microsoft, and the Google boys Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Soros was excited with the 
green fuel. He participated in the project to build three sugar and alcohol mills in Mato 
Grosso do Sul. Enterprise value: $900 million. Together, the three units will process 11 
million tons per year and produce one billion liters of alcohol. Apart from ethanol, the 
Hungarian  financier’s  company,  ADECO,  also  operates  in  cotton  and  coffee  in  the 
Country. “When everything is working, the revenues from operations in Brazil may be 
the same as in Argentina,” said Marcelo Vieira, the main partner of Soros in Brazil. It is 
estimated that Soros’ rural operations in Argentina has reached a turnover of US$30 
million. 
The  largest  state-owned  Chinese  food  industry,  China  National  Agricultural 
Development Group Corporation, is also an example of the offensive of international 
capital  on Brazilian soil.  This  company operates in  40 countries  and 10,000 out of 
80,000 employees work abroad. The company owns six thousand acres in Tanzania and 
set up business in the food sector also in Guinea, Benin and Zambia and has entered 
into Argentina and Peru. Other Chinese companies have also purchased land in several 
countries  with  the same goal:  ensuring  products  to  China  that  are  essential  to  its 
economic growth and urbanization of hundreds of millions of people. Since the last 
decade,  the  Chinese  government  is  increasing  investment  in  natural  resources 
elsewhere.  So  far,  its  most  impressive  breakthrough  occurred  in  Africa,  where 
investments  in  mining  and  later  the  purchase  of  land  were  accompanied  by 
cooperation  projects  with  the  host  countries,  mostly  poor  and  low-rating- 
development. The next step in the strategy was to negotiate projects with several Latin 
American governments. An example of this onslaught of international capital on the 
Brazilian land and the strategy adopted by CNADC (Chinese state-owned of agricultural 
development),  which  in  2011  announced  an  investment  of  seven  billion  dollars 
earmarked for participation in projects of grain crops expansion in the state of Goias 
with an estimated area of 2.4 million acres devoted to soybean production that will be 
exported to  China.  It  should  be noted that this  country  has been consolidating an 
international base of supply of raw materials and foodstuffs from Australia, Indonesia, 
countries in Africa and Latin America over the past few years. Highlighting the fact that 
a 93% of capital invested in Brazil in 2010 comes from SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises).
In  addition  to  the  international  conditions,  which  impose  a  reprimarization  to  the 
Brazilian economy, there are international constraints that reject the possibility of a 
comprehensive agrarian reform. In this plan, successive Brazilian governments, despite 
of a supposedly closer government of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva to the cause of agrarian 
reform, have perpetuated a land situation that has been slightly modified in the past 
few years. In 2009, a 0.91% of the properties, referring to properties with more than 
1,000ha, accounted for a 44.42% of the occupied area, while the ones holdings less 
than  10ha  occupied  only  a  2.36%  of  the  area,  revealing  the  high  degree  of  land 
concentration in this country. Another indicator is the Gini coefficient applied to the 
concentration of land: in 1967 this index equaled 0.836, evolving to 0.854 in 2006. 
The fact is that, historically both, in military and authoritarian governments, whether 
in governments marked by electoral democracy (which we have left), the structure of 
land ownership has slightly changed over the last fifty years. The chart below shows 
the different profiles of land ownership underwent minor changes between 1960 and 
2006, revealing that beyond an option of the current government, the non-completion 
of a more profound land and agrarian reform has been perpetuated as a policy of 
State.  After  the  end  of  the  military  dictatorship  and  the  democratization  of  the 
national political scene in 1985, it would be expected that the popular forces and more 
equitable  social  projects  occupied  spaces  of  decisions  and  allowed the  reform.  To 
some extent, this was the attemption in the National Plan for Agrarian Reform in 1985 
and  1988  Federal  Constitution.  However,  with  the  subsequent  accession  to  the 
neoliberal model and the related erosion of citizenship, which we saw was just the 
opposite:  despite of  the percentage-increase in arable land available,  26.7% of  the 
country to 31.3% between 1989 and 2010, it revealed the persistence of inequality, of 
land concentration and the property profiles shown below: 
Gráfico 1 - % arable land owned between 1960 and 2006.
Source: www.sidra.ibge.gov.br
It  would be expected that in a country where land reform was part of a structural 
project  of  agrarian  transformation,  the  proportions  above  outlined  presented 
significant changes, since it is a long historical series (almost fifty years). However, the 
Brazilian  case,  as observed in the long term, indicates inflexibility  in  regard to  the 
percentage share of ownership tracks on the farmland. Properties with less than ten 
hectares in this  period amounted to approximately half  of  the total,  decreasing to 
47.86% in 2006, when it would be expected, if the option had been the land reform, 
that this profile would increase its percentage due to the reduction of other property 
profiles. These data suggest that the change in land ownership structure is not set as a 
project in Brazilian government and society in the long term, the option seems to be 
“to freeze” the structure of land with compensation policies to ensure the viability of 
small farms but do not expand, or to expand up to the point where they do not threat 
the absolute predominance of large property linked to agribusiness exports. Policies 
such  as  PRONAF  (Program  for  Strengthening  Family  Agriculture),  ATER  (Technical 
Assistance and Rural  Extension)  Bolsa Verde (which includes a benefit  of  $  300.00 
monthly, seeds and tanks) and Bolsa Familia itself, which also covers portions of the 
rural population, are examples of this strategy. These policies make up what Delgado 
called “Constrained Adjustment”, because they do not propose any output and they 
are designated for a minority of small family farmers and settlers. 
The current president, Dilma Rousseff, has used these mechanisms in combating rural 
poverty, which according to her understanding, affect in a more brutal manner the 
economic system than the current configuration of land ownership. The predominant 
logic has been to supply an income to families until  they are able to integrate the 
production structure and the market. This policy is explained, in our opinion, by some 
factors:
a) Absence of prospects for changing in the economic model;
b)  fiscal  and  structural  limits  of  our  economy  and  the(growing)  related   need  to 
generate surpluses through export of commodities feasible only on large scales (large 
estates), especially in fields related to the production of biofuels;
c) the abrupt rise in land prices, which raises the costs of land reform;
d) the political strength of the caucus (rural row of seats)and forceful defense that the 
Brazilian government has made this quite specialized form of insertion in the global 
economy, exemplified in the adoption of the new Forest Code, which leaves openings 
for maintenance and expansion of deforestation;
e) the lack of mobilization of the largest portion of the population, for today only a 
15.6% of the population is allocated in the agricultural sectors, with only a 11% of the 
workforce allocated in rural areas, indicating that the high degree of urbanization of 
Brazilian society hinders the universal of agrarian reform banner.
f) with laudable exceptions, such as the MST and Via Campesina, the degree of political 
mobilization on this issue is very low.
In this context, it is no wonder that the credit for settlements has declined significantly 
between 2008 and 2011 (1.6 billion to nine hundred million dollars), as well  as the 
disbursement of resources for the acquisition of land for agrarian reform, which were 
reduced from 1.92 billion in 2005 to 482 million reais in 2011. In fact, the government 
has disbursed below the approved LOA (Law of Annual Budget), as in the case of credit 
granting, where nine hundred million dollars were approved for 2011, of which only 
thirty  million  were  effectively  spent.  It  is  not  surprising,  in  these  terms,  that  the 
number of families being settled have been considerably reduced in recent years, as 
seen in the chart below:
Gráfico 2 – Families settled by INCRA
Source: INCRA (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária)
b) Resistence:
The  current  dilemmas  listed  above  do  not  indicate  the  absence  of  struggle  and 
resistance, they just give us a more accurate idea of  the challenge scales to social 
movements whose flag passes through land reform. This is not a recent demand of the 
Brazilian society, it has emerged with great force in the Peasant Leagues in the 1950’s. 
Initially created in Pernambuco, they have spread into other states expanding agrarian 
disputes about the reality of the country. The Leagues spoke on behalf of a broad and 
diverse category of workers that included tenants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers and 
smallholders who produced a subsistence crop and traded the surpluses produced in 
their own or another land. In this sense, we should remember that the use of the term 
“peasant” seems to have been a factor of identification and unit to designate such a 
broad  category  opposed  to  a  common  adversary,  called  by  political  leaders  as 
“unproductive and decadent large estates”. 
As  the  represented  layers  are  basically  dependent  on  the  direct  production  on 
transferred, rented or own (small farms) land, we can understand why they coalesced 
around causes linked to immediate possession and enjoyment of the land. The overall 
process  of  politicization that occurred in  this  period,  particularly  since 1960,  easily 
converted  individual  or  located  demands  for  land  into  broader  claims.  This 
mobilization,  along  with  the  growing  strength  of  trade  unions  and  some  political 
approximation  to  the  government  of  Joao  Goulart,  was  enough  for  the  most 
reactionary sectors of Brazilian society to sponsor a military coup in 1964, when the 
popular forces in favor of land reform were strikingly persecuted and annihilated by 
the national army and its supporters, opening up space for an economic model even 
more concentrating of  wealth,  income and land.  There is,  at  this  moment,  intense 
modernization  of  Brazilian  agriculture,  the  “painful  modernization”  with  capitalist 
development  in  the field  without changing the structure of  land ownership,  which 
resulted in the impoverishment of the agricultural population and a major rural-urban 
exodus of twentieth century.
According to the organic intellectual Joao Pedro Stedile, the Movement of Landless 
Rural  Workers  –  the  MST  –  derives  directly  from  the  Peasant  Leagues.  Officially 
founded in the city of Cascavel-PR in 1984, this movement comes from the growing 
political  activism  itself  towards  the  end  military  dictatorship,  the  very  painful 
modernization,  which  showed  a  series  of  contradictions  in  rural  Brazil,  the 
participation of the more progressive sectors of the Catholic Church and the political 
history of the South, region where the movement was originated.
As Bernard M. Fernandes in his book The Formation of the MST in Brazil, the MST was 
born in the occupation of land and this action is its first instrument of struggle against 
land concentration and the State. According to him, because the non implementation 
of agrarian reform, the landless intensify the struggle through occupations, requiring 
the government to carry out a policy of rural settlements, which, if it is not ideal as we 
have seen, at least it is  placed. The organization of the MST as a social movement 
today is already present in almost all states of the federation, which illustrates their 
representation in national terms.
The history of MST, as the history of the whole Brazilian rural life, is marked by great 
violence.  In  one  of  the  most  brutal  battles,  in  Eldorado  dos  Carajas-PA,  nineteen 
landless workers were executed at point black range by the police on April 17th, 1996. 
The confrontation occurred when about five hundred thousand landless blocked the 
highway BR-155, which connects this city to the state capital, Belem. From the national 
protests and demonstrations came the pressures that triggered the creation of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development in 1999, showing triumph in the movement, later 
frustrated as it could be seen.
Because of  their  action strategies,  involving the invasion of  unproductive land, the 
occupation of public buildings, conducting marches (such as the National March for 
Agrarian Reform, Employment and Justice, which came out of Governador Valadares, 
Minas Gerais, and went to Brasilia, a distance of 1,032 km, which was attended by 
thousands of landless in 1997), the Pastoral Land, education at various levels (literacy, 
high school, the teaching of the mystical, undergraduate and graduate), the foundation 
of  the  Florestan  Fernandes  National  School  and  the  Social  Movements  Popular 
University,  which put in  touch critical  intellectuals,  social  leaders  and activists,  the 
MST, beside Via Campesina, has managed to keep it for nearly thirty years as one of 
the main social movements in Latin America, with over 1.5 million members, and it is 
certainly responsible for the maintenance of land reform as one of the issues of social 
demand. However, as we saw, as land reform loses ground in Brazilian government 
and society, the channels of access to a more broadly land and agrarian policy narrows.
The fact is that in the current framework, the Agrarian reform flag; an old flag of the 
capitalist development and as last bourgeois,  fights against the large state, the  fight 
against  the  agribusiness,  to  combat  against  the  Brazilian' insertion  in  the  global 
economy,  fight against  the  current  consumption patterns,  to  fight for  new energy 
matrix,  the  fight against  food  contamination  by  pesticides  and  fertilizers,  anti-
capitalism,  the  revolutionary  struggle.  This  fight  goes  on.  In  2010,  based  on  the 
Pastoral  Land  Commission,  there  were  638  conflicts  over  land  and  only  by  this 
mechanism the Agrarian Reform can reclaim the space on stage today, totally adverse.
